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Abstract 
This article explores the theoretical and methodological challenges of collecting and 
analysing everyday online political talk in China, and outlines our approach to defining 
and coding such talk. In so doing, the article is designed to encourage further research 
in this area, taking forward a new agenda for online deliberation (Wright, 2012a), and 
supporting this important area of research.  
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, a great deal has been written about the potential of the internet to 
facilitate political talk and deliberation, and to strengthen the public sphere, be it in China 
(Yang & Calhoun, 2007; Rauchfleisch & Schafer, 2015), Australia (e.g. Bruns et al., 2010), 
or beyond (Papacharissi, 2002; Wright 2007). Everyday political talk is the foundation stone 
of the public sphere (Habermas, 1984) and fundamental to civic life because “through 
everyday political talk, citizens construct their identities, achieve mutual understanding, 
produce public reason, form considered opinions…” (Kim & Kim, 2008, p. 51). Political talk 
is, quite simply, crucial to healthy citizenship (Dahlgren, 2006, p. 282) because it facilitates 
political knowledge, engagement and opinion change (Price & Cappella, 2002; Huckfeldt et 
al., 2004) and can lead people to take, or call for, political actions (Graham et al., 2015, 
2016). Everyday political talk can do this because it encourages shared perspective building 
or complementary agency: intersubjective processes whereby people link their personal ideas, 
issues, and actions with one another, cultivating political agency, solidarity and community 
(McAfee, 2000, p. 134; Fearson, 1998). Such talk can be pre- or proto-political; a latent or 
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standby resource; ‘potentially political’, important to the ‘microdynamics of democracy’ 
(Dahlgren, 2006, p. 282; Ekman & Amna, 2012, pp. 287-8); and can provide a “gateway 
toward the stirrings of a broader social consciousness” (Howe, 2012), creating a sense of 
public empowerment and voice (Coleman, 2013, pp. 219-220), and facilitate broader civic 
involvement. 
In considering everyday online political talk, China is a particularly interesting case 
because:  
Digital media in China reflect the many contradictions of the Chinese society: 
rapid diffusion but glaring digital divides, significant economic freedom but strict 
political control, new opportunities for civic engagement but with pervasive 
surveillance. The mix of politics with market and the unique Chinese culture have 
created a multifaceted Internet, sometimes reinforcing while other times 
restructuring political and social inequalities… (Chen and Reese, 2015, p. 1).  
 
While political debate and action is heavily controlled and restricted in China (Bamman, 
O’Connor & Smith, 2012; King et al., 2013, 2014; Fu et al., 2013a, b), everyday talk turns 
political in a wide variety of everyday online contexts (or third spaces, see Wright, 2012b; 
Wright et al., 2016) and in various political ‘shades’ from the ‘obvious’ formal political 
topics to the more ambiguous and difficult to detect that are evocative of the political and 
personal turn (Wright, 2012a, b; Graham et al., 2016). Moreover, some Chinese ‘Netizens’ 
use coded language and metaphors to make political points and arguments, adding another 
layer of complexity to the debate (Rauchfleisch & Schafer, 2015). In combination, this makes 
it difficult for censors who want to identify and control political talk. Thus we argue that the 
different hues of political talk that emerge from within the everyday, ‘non-political’ Chinese 
online sphere(s) are an important avenue for political debate. However, this complexity also 
makes it difficult for researchers who want to analyse everyday political talk in China. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the analysis of everyday Chinese online political talk, 
particularly in ‘third spaces’, remains scant.  
In this article, we outline our approach to theorising and operationalizing everyday 
political talk in China, and reflect on some of the challenges that we faced in doing so. The 
article is organised into three principal sections. First, we set out why everyday political talk 
matters so much in China, and our theoretical approach to defining and identifying everyday 
online political talk in China. Second, we outline our approach to analysing the nature of 
everyday online political talk in China. Finally, we discuss the different methodological 
challenges that we faced during our analysis in 2015, and how we met them. 
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The ‘space’ of everyday online political talk in China 
In the Chinese context, the potential for the internet to facilitate a freer form of public 
political communication has been celebrated for its diversity (Rauchfleisch & Schafer, 2015; 
Song et al., 2016), with several examples of online political communication and activism 
leading to substantive changes in the law or, at least, to weak and sometimes scattered publics 
from which a civic identity can be built (Yang, 2009, 2013, p. 16; Qiu & Chan, 2011; Jiang, 
2012; Sukosed & Fu, 2013). Jiang (2010) conceptualises the Chinese internet as a ‘sphere 
composed of diverse yet connected spaces where the influence of the state varies, thus 
creating disparate conditions for public deliberation’. Jiang goes on to draw a distinction 
between four types of online space in China ‘extending from the core to the peripheries of 
authoritarian rule: central propaganda spaces, government-regulated commercial spaces, 
emergent civic spaces, and international deliberative spaces’. For Jiang (2010), democracy is 
not necessarily a precursor for public deliberation because people may be able to circumvent 
authoritarian control. Even where they do not, there might be a form of permitted 
authoritarian deliberation (He & Warren, 2011).  
Early research by Huang (1997) and Qiu (2000) was less positive about the impact of the 
internet on political talk in China, finding that a mixture of strict discussion rules and 
censorship in Chinese bulletin board systems (BBS) led to limited political talk on ‘hard topic 
discussion’ about democracy and other political topics, a finding that was broadly confirmed 
by Qiu (2000). For Qiu, online political talk is: “contingent upon the institutional barriers set 
by the Chinese authorities between the domestic and foreign cyberspaces, between the 
apolitical arenas and the sphere of Open Platform Communications. The totality of these 
constraints is virtual censorship…” (2000, p. 4). In a similar vein, Qinglian (2008) argues that 
the regime has successfully kept people ignorant and neutered the potential for political 
organising. However, research has shown that there are variations in how companies enforce 
regulations (MacKinnon, 2009), which is indicative of the complex socio-technical 
environment for online political talk in China. 
At the heart of these debates is what we might call the space of political talk. Damm, for 
example (2007, p. 276), criticises the ‘mono-causal interpretation’ and the narrow focus on 
political websites which “fails to take into account the thousands of other websites, forums, 
and blogs left untouched. These are not focused specifically on political issues, but 
nevertheless discuss essential societal developments in China”. As Yang (2009, pp. 1-2) 




… one of control and the other of entertainment” and this creates a 
“misconception that because of governmental internet control, Chinese internet 
users do nothing but play. The real struggles of the Chinese people are thus 
ignored, and the radical nature of Chinese internet culture is dismissed. Yet, not 
only is internet entertainment not apolitical, but political control itself is an arena 
of struggle […] The most unorthodox, imaginative, and subversive ideas can be 
found in Chinese cyberspace. Authority of all kinds is subject to doubt and 
ridicule. Ordinary people engage in a broad range of political action and find a 
new sense of self, community and empowerment.  
 
Similarly Chen and Reese (2015, p. 2) observe that the “focus on the more visible examples 
of top-down regulation and control understates how networked technologies have helped 
create new forms of civic engagement from the bottom up” while Rosen (2010, pp. 512-513) 
argues that there is a fluidity to the “state-society equilibrium [that] is based on a compromise 
between an empowered public and an endangered leadership”. While there are undoubtedly 
differences between core and periphery, as noted by Jiang, the central point of contention 
between the more positive and pessimistic analyses is the extent to which the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) has either chosen to allow “greater civic and political speech freedoms” 
and “relaxe[d] its grip over political discourse in exchange for its own legitimacy and 
survival” (Jiang, 2010, np) or is simply unable to control online activism as it responds and 
adapts to new restrictions (Yang, 2009, p. 44).  
To address these debates, we argue that the space of political talk is key (Wright et al., 
2016) and that it is important to analyse everyday political talk as it emerges in ‘third spaces’ 
which are formally non-political and may or may not be geographically-focused online 
communities, but where political talk can emerge (Wright, 2012a, b). To this end, we chose 
to focus our research on one potential Chinese third space: an online ‘lifestyle’ discussion 
forum (or BBS) with a significant help function. Interestingly, the forum chooses to pre-
moderate every post. In other words, every message is vetted to decide whether or not to post 
it. In a commercially-run forum with tens of millions of posts, this is an exhaustive and 
expensive task. Thus, while arguably it is towards the periphery in Jiang’s terms it is, at the 
same time, close. Thus it is questionable just how far the periphery is from the centre. While 
it may be an ‘emergent civic space’, it is also a ‘government-regulated commercial space’, 
and this may curtail its civic potential. We can assume that the moderators have actively 
allowed discernible political talk.  
Analysing political talk in non-political online spaces raises a series of methodological 
challenges, and it is to this that we now turn. 
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‘The political’ beyond the political 
Defining the political in political talk is notoriously tricky. In recent years, there has been a 
shift to encourage more inclusive definitions of politics in the western democratic context. 
This is because people are, it is thought, increasingly disengaged from formal politics, 
choosing to participate in more lifestyle-focused ways that are not captured by traditional 
definitions (Bennett, 1998; Hay, 2002, 2007; Ekman & Amna, 2012). As we know, formal 
political talk in China is heavily regulated. However, there may be more freedom for the 
politics of the everyday; of the political. Much of the literature on China focuses on debates 
around formal politics, contention or counter-hegemonic activity (e.g. Yang, 2009, 2013). 
There is a distinction to be made, however, between political talk and contention. Political 
contention will almost certainly require political talk, but political talk does not have to be 
contentious in character. For example, is someone engaging in political contention when 
talking about her or his personal experience of financial hardship bringing up a child? We 
would suggest not. However, following Mansbridge (1999), it is political talk to the extent 
that the person links the issue from the private sphere to the public context (Graham, 2008; 
Graham & Harju, 2011). But even if the talk remains private, it may still have an important 
political function (Dahlgren, 2006). Indeed, what might be considered pre/proto-political talk 
in a western democratic context arguably is political in China because it could be interpreted 
as questioning the principle of party supremacy and may be considered contentious, or even 
subversive, by the Chinese state—by power.  
This arguably necessitates a shift in emphasis from ‘collective’ or ‘public good’ political 
talk and actions to private, personal/individualist—and perhaps lifestyle-oriented—topics, the 
value of which is contested (see Rosen, 2010; Bennett, 2003). If it is correct to argue that the 
‘unique characteristics’ of online activism in China make it  “more likely to be episodic and 
spontaneous, often without formal organization” in the vein of connective action (Yuan, 
2015, p. 223; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013), this places greater emphasis on how actions 
emerge through everyday political talk in the general public sphere and how the fermenting 
and fomenting that occurs there percolates into the strong public sphere (Wright, 2015; 
Graham et al., 2015, 2016). In turn, this would suggest that scholars need to turn (or renew) 
their attention to “the restructuring of centre-periphery relations, politicizing the demands of 
various sectors of society, and the struggle over the definition of the realm of the political” 
and must pay particular attention to “new forms of mediated communication as a discursive 
field or space in which competing discourses struggle for visibility and legitimacy” (Yuan, 
2015, p. 224).  
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Bringing this together, the barrier for what counts as political talk and action is arguably 
lower, or at least different, in China. It falls into grey areas—or “boundary spanning” as 
O’Brien and Li (2006, p. 50) describe it—that “crosses between the legitimate and 
illegitimate” (Yang, 2009, p. 3). While people may disagree with this analysis, and the 
boundaries have blurry edges, such pre/proto-political talk is, we argue, even more important 
in China, and can be considered a political action in and of itself. In making this analysis, 
how to interpret the party supremacy principle is important. At its most extreme, any 
discourse that questions the party could be considered as subversive or dissident. But, as has 
been shown, dissent is permitted within certain parameters—it depends on how it is framed 
and whether it could be perceived as mobilising. Some criticism can be seen as helping the 
CPC.1 
Identifying everyday online political talk in China 
Graham (2008) has noted that identifying political talk in non-political spaces is like looking 
for needles in a haystack, and this helps to explain the lack of research (Wright, 2012a) in this 
area. In previous research we have quantified the amount of political talk in third spaces by 
reading a random sample of all posts (Graham and Wright, 2014). This exploratory research 
design enabled us to understand the volume and nature of political talk in such spaces and 
informed our subsequent approach. While this understanding has value, it means that coders 
read large amounts of material that is not political. To overcome this problem, we 
subsequently used keywords to identify political talk, which can be categorised into four 
groupings: politicians, political parties, political institutions and general terms, such as 
‘democracy’ and ‘politics’ (Graham et al. 2015, 2016). While each mention was checked to 
ensure it occurred in a political context, an initial sorting by keywords made the process of 
identifying political talk easier. We were also concerned that using broad definitions of 
politics would lead some people to argue that the results were about the definition of politics 
rather than a realistic account of political talk.  
For the Chinese context, we were concerned that in a non-political context it would 
simply be too resource-intensive to manually read messages looking for political talk. 
Initially, we used a broad list of keywords, including both political institutions and 
governance, and a range of socio-political issues such as smog and food scandals.3 This 
approach was deliberately broad because we did not want to make too many assumptions and 
because we also wanted to understand what topics were not being discussed or published. We 
also included the encoded terms for the same topics where we could identify them.  
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Analysing the coded public sphere can be ‘a game of cat and mouse’: if authorities 
discover a coded word, it can be added to the sensitive list. We used a mixture of personal 
knowledge and dictionaries of keywords (Ng, 2013).4 For example, one of our keywords, 
‘CCTV’ (China Central Television), is sensitive, and within China ‘CCAV’ is often used to 
avoid censorship. As with many coded words, it also carries a satirical meaning used to 
communicate discontent, here with CCTV and its role as the ‘throat organ’ of the party state.  
Analysing and assessing everyday political talk in China 
After identifying political talk, the next question is how to analyse such talk. A number of 
studies on the nature of online political talk in China focus on measuring the deliberativeness 
of political talk as a means of determining the extent to which online platforms are conducive 
to (particular) conditions of deliberation (e.g. Lewis, 2013; Thimm et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 
2008). The work of Habermas—especially his theory of communicative rationality and 
discourse ethics—has been highly influential (1984, 1987, 1989). For example, Song et al. 
(2016) undertook a large-scale (machine-learning based content analysis and social network) 
analysis of political debate on Chinese food safety on Weibo (the Chinese version of 
Twitter). They conclude that  
much of the political talk on Weibo is emotional, expressing anger, fear or sadness […] 
As such, the Weibo mediated communication space cannot easily be defended as 
occasioning rational, critical discussion leading to consensus, nor to instrumental, 
utilitarian engagement leading to a concrete policy outcome (Song et al., 2016, p. 532).  
 
The Song et al. study is interesting because it shines a light on the use of expressive 
communication. While this is framed negatively in terms of theories of the deliberative public 
sphere, the authors still see some value in this talk:  
Users' expressive repertoires on Weibo do reveal something important about civic 
engagement that is increasingly personalized and based in life practices. Within Weibo-
mediated discussion space, there are a lot of people talking politics […] expressing 
emotion in online political talk enables a wider array of voices and perspectives to be 
heard on Weibo. […] This kind of life-style political engagement is hard to explain in 
terms of instrumental or rational communication. Rather, it is a clear manifestation of 
‘expressive rationality (Song et al., 2016, p. 532). 
 
While Song et al. do not really explain what they mean by expressive rationality, and their 
textual analysis is an automated sentiment analysis (which is a rather limited way to assess 
expressiveness), their work suggests a need to move beyond rational-critical understandings 
of deliberation. This is an issue that we attempt to address here. 
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First, as has been argued elsewhere, analysing everyday talk in informal online 
communicative spaces requires a more inclusive definition of what constitutes the talk in 
political talk (e.g. Graham, 2008; Coleman & Moss, 2012; Wright, 2012a). Privileging formal 
notions of deliberation ignores the realities of everyday political talk; the ways in which 
people talk politics in ways that make sense to them. The everyday reality of making sense of 
politics is typically rooted in people’s personal, subjective experiences, which are often 
expressed not through rational-critical debate but through other (often expressive) 
communicative forms such as storytelling, using humour and complaining. We might expect 
this to be particularly true in Chinese third spaces where humour is routinized in the coded 
public sphere. For these reasons, if we apply Habermas-inspired “idealized, and arguably 
impossible criteria by which to measure deliberation” in online places such as Weibo or 
lifestyle forums we might “preclude a positive outcome at the outset” (Wright, 2012a, p. 12). 
Thus, in order to provide a better understanding of how people talk politics in everyday 
online spaces, we need to move beyond elite normative frameworks by taking into account 
other communicative forms and the expressive nature of everyday talk.  
Second, we wanted to allow room for exploring other communicative forms used by 
Chinese citizens, providing a more comprehensive account of the nature of online political 
talk in the Chinese context. To this end, we developed a content analysis coding scheme 
consisting of two analytical levels (building on Graham, 2008). Level one (divided into two 
parts) operationalizes Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, and was created to assess the 
deliberative quality of political talk. First we will present communicative form and process. 
Building on the Habermas concept, rational-critical debate requires that participants provide 
reasoned claims which are critically reflected upon: “people’s public use of reason” to 
support their claims in political debates is very crucial to the public sphere (Habermas, 1989, 
p. 27). Coherence and continuity is also considered important to deliberation: participants 
should stick to the topic of discussion until some form of agreement or understanding is 
achieved. This content analysis coding scheme for the first part of level one, deliberation, is 






Table 1: Coding scheme Level 1A (part 1, Deliberation) 
Code Title Definition 
Argument (reasoned 
claim) 
A comment that provides a reasoned claim—presence of 
justification (formal presence of causal structures). 
Evidence use a) Fact/Source: An argument that supports its claim by 
providing a fact or source. 
b) Example/anecdotal evidence: An argument that supports its 
claim by providing a relevant example, which may include 
historical events, current events, comparisons and analogies 
between events, and hypothetical examples. 
c) Personal experience: An argument that supports its claim by 
providing personal experience.  
Assertion (non-reasoned 
claim) 




A comment that is on topic, in line with the political topic under 
discussion within the thread. 
Argumentative depth 
(continuity) 
A comment that is part of an exchange of claims, which includes: 
a) Counter: a comment that provides a reasoned claim in which 
an alternative claim is proposed in response to a competing claim 
or argument.   
b) Rebuttal: a comment that provides a reasoned claim in 
directly contradicting or challenging a competing claim or 
argument.  
c) Refute: a comment that provides a reasoned claim which 
directly defends an earlier claim or argument against a 
corresponding rebuttal.  
d) Affirmation: a comment that provides reasoned support in 
favour of another claim or argument. 
Convergence A comment that assents, concedes (partial assent), or agrees-to-
disagree with/to another participant’s claim or argument. 
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The second part of level 1, as shown in Table 2, focuses on the dispositional requirements for 
achieving mutual understanding. First, reciprocity requires that participants listen and 
respond to each other’s questions, arguments, and opinions. Second, reflexivity is the internal 
or subjective process of reflecting another’s argument or position against one’s own. Third, 
an empathetic exchange occurs when a person tries to see themselves in another’s shoes. 
Finally, sincerity implies that participants make all information relevant to the discussion 
(including their intentions, motives, desires and interests) known to other participants, and 
that all information provided is sincere and truthful 
 
Table 2: Coding scheme Level 1B  
(part 2, Dispositional requirements for achieving mutual understanding) 
Reciprocity All comments are coded for whether they are a reply to another post or are 
a stand-alone post: 
a) Stand-alone post: A comment that is not directed at any of the 
participants or other posts in the discussion.  
b) Reply: A comment that is a direct reply to another participant(s) or 
contents of a participant’s post (typically done via the reply function). 
Reflexive 
argument 
A comment that provides:  
(a) a reasoned claim, an argument; (b) evidence to support that argument; 
(c) reasoned responsiveness to challenges by providing rebuttals and 
refutes; (d) and evidence in support of a challenge or defence against one. 
Empathetic 
exchange 
A comment that indicates the author has imagined his- or herself in another 




A comment that questions the sincerity or truthfulness of another 
participant’s person, claim, argument, or statements in general. 
 
The second level of the coding frame focuses on norms of debate (see Table 3). Discursive 
equality requires that participants respect each other as equals thereby prohibiting abusive 
and degrading communicative practices. Discursive freedom requires that participants are 




Table 3: Coding Scheme Level 2 
(Norms of debate: Discursive equality and freedom) 
Degrading A comment that degrades—to lower in character, quality, esteem, or rank—
another participant and/or participant’s claim, argument or opinion in general. 
Neglected A comment containing an argument that is not attended to by other 
participants—lacking a reciprocal exchange.  
Acknowledgemen
t 
A comment that acknowledges the presence, departure, or conversational 
actions of another participant, such as greeting, thanking, apologizing, and 
complementing. 
Curbing A comment that attempts to suppress, restrict, or prevent another participant’s 
claim, argument, position, opinion, or statements in general. 
 
As Table 4 reveals, level two of the coding scheme moves beyond formal notions of 
deliberation to identify other communicative forms and speech acts: attention, complaining, 
questioning, storytelling, and advice giving. First, the expression of attention is often used by 
Chinese internet users to convey their concern about a public issue. This can include 
comments like ‘I will pay attention to this issue’ or ‘I will continue to pay attention to it’. In 
this way they are communicating their concern and promising to monitor an issue without 
calling for collective action or active intervention, such as protests, that would likely raise the 
ire of censors. Second, given the increasing social tensions in China, complaining and 
questioning are speech acts that contain much civic value. Through questioning, speakers can 
draw attention to the legitimacy of a certain policy or the authorities’ way of dealing with 
problems, applying a pressure to act or, at least, to be accountable. Third, people engage in 
political talk by sharing personal experiences and stories (storytelling and chatter). Everyday 
political talk, especially in spaces dedicated to lifestyle issues, is often deeply connected to 
participants’ personal lives. Such communicative practices open up spaces of personal and 
emotional relationships through which Chinese citizens can forge affective bonds that allow 
for deeper levels of understanding (Graham et al., 2015, 2016). Finally, we coded for advice 
giving, a form of civic involvement that potentially fosters a sense of belonging and 




Table 4: Other communicative forms and speech acts 
Attention A comment that expresses concern about an issue. The symbol or word 
for attention is often used by people on Chinese social media and implies 
monitoring power from the citizens. For example:  
I will pay attention to this issue or continue to pay attention to it.  
Complaining A comment expressing a participant’s dissatisfaction with an issue or 
certain state of affairs. 
Questioning A comment that poses questions concerning the issue or relevant policies. 
This includes comments that raise questions about the legitimacy of a 
policy or response (accountability). 
Storytelling and 
Chatter 
A comment where a participant tells a story (e.g. personal experience), 
gives an account of events (e.g. what they did that day) or simply 
provides some sort of personal information (e.g. likes, dislikes, interests).  
Advice 
Giving/Helping 
A comment that provides advice, recommendation or, more generally, 
helps another participant.  
 
Having outlined both the theoretical background to, and method for, identifying and 
analysing everyday political talk in China, we next outline and address several challenges that 
we faced during the conduct of this research.  
 
Methodological challenges 
Our attempt in 2015 to analyse everyday political talk in China generated a number of 
challenges, and it is important to discuss these, and how we addressed them, as this may help 
others.  
 
Issue 1: Collecting Weibo data 
To analyse microblogs such as Weibo, the most common approach is to use an Application 
Programming Interface (API). Public APIs are created by websites to provide a ‘window’ 
onto some of their data in the ‘back end’, and to allow third party App developers an easy 
way to work with websites. They are particularly important for social media, where data is 
voluminous and dynamic. For researchers, APIs make data relatively easy to collect. 
However, there are many issues. First, many APIs are ‘black boxes’ and researchers do not 
know how representative the given data is. Thus, researchers need to think carefully about 
sample design and clearly communicate its limitations. Second, APIs typically do not provide 
access to historical data, often only going back a short period. Thus, researchers often collect 
live data, working from a point going forward. Third, at any time companies can change what 
data is made available through the API, and the general trend has been towards more 
restrictions – seemingly informed by an economic rationale that has similarities between 
Twitter and Weibo (Fuchs, 2015).1  
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Collecting Weibo data is more problematic. First, we were either refused access to Sina’s 
APIs, or access was heavily restricted, to the point of being redundant. This meant that we 
could not extend an experimental Weibo data importer for NodeXL (a plug-in for Excel that 
can collect social media data and create social network maps). As we needed to use keyword 
searches to identify political talk, we chose to build a custom scraper to collect search returns 
directly from the website. Rather than asking for back end data through an API, scrapers 
work by visiting webpages and collecting data from the front end – from the visible website. 
Scraping is generally considered to be more difficult because, while most websites are written 
in a common language (e.g. HTML), the person(s) who construct or write the HTML all 
‘speak’ in slightly different ways – thus websites typically have slightly different underlying 
code. This means that each website, and often different types of pages within a website, 
requires a unique script to be written to scrape the content. There are now tools that can 
scrape websites without the need to write code, such as Outwit Hub. Nevertheless, the 
process of visiting each page is time consuming and also meant that some of the back-end 
metadata available through the API could not be collected. Ultimately, though, we were 
successful in creating a useful sample. 
 
Issue 2: Chinese BBS - scale and access  
To collect data from the BBS, we again built a custom scraper. For this research we used a 
mixture of Outwit and custom-written scripts. However, collecting data from our Chinese 
forum proved difficult: numerous barriers were placed in our way.  
Initially, we had wanted to analyse the impact of ‘super-participants’ on the nature 
(discursive equality) of political talk: ‘super-posters’ who had created more than 2000 posts 
(SP1s); set the agenda for debate (SP2s), and the moderators and facilitators (SP3s) – (see 
Graham and Wright 2014, 2015). In theory, the analysis covers all users and all threads since 
a forum was started, though often data is lost, deleted, or older threads are removed to ensure 
a forum does not slow down. Nevertheless, analysing super-participation proved very 
difficult. First, no overarching forum statistics were published (e.g. total numbers of posts 
created, users, threads), and this made it hard to know the scale of the task that we faced. This 
is important when considering sampling and research design. It was possible to collate some 
of this information by collecting all of the visible threads and the numbers of posts in each 
thread. However, as noted, this is unlikely to be all of the data because forums ‘clean’ or 
‘hide’ older threads to maintain performance. Second, we found that the forum was often 
tortuously slow to load pages, and occasionally stopped returning data completely. This 
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meant we had to slow down data collection. Third, there was no list of members, something 
that is provided by most forums outside of China. To provide an over-arching analysis of 
super-participation, we needed aggregate statistics on the total numbers of threads started and 
posts created by each member. Each member does have an individual profile page from 
which, in theory, we could collect the data. In previous forums we have analysed (outside of 
China), the user-list has a common structure, going up sequentially with a unique URL for 
every account. In our Chinese BBS, profile pages were randomly assigned a URL within a 
large range. In an attempt to overcome this, we built another custom profile scraper and used 
a team of virtual machines in the cloud (that is, they were software-based implementations of 
a machine/computer on remote servers). We broke the URLs into a series of shorter lists and 
then visited each page to see if it was a valid account, collecting the username (for data 
verification) and total number of posts and threads created to see if they were super-posters 
(SP1s) or agenda-setters (SP2s).  
Unfortunately, the combination of a slow website and the randomisation of user/member 
URLs left us insufficient time to collect the data. In total, we visited 3.1m pages, identifying 
380,000 valid profile pages—identifying over 300 SP1s. As we did not have a complete list 
of users, we had to change our sampling design for this part of the study to a random sample 
of visible threads and then analyse the patterns of participation within this. 
This speaks to another issue: the sheer scale of Chinese social media. Looking just at our 
incomplete list of SP1s, in the Chinese forum they had made a total of 4.03m posts, at an 
average of 5,036 posts each. Within the SP1s, 80 users had made over 10,000 posts, with the 
ten most frequent posters averaging 24,638 posts each. By comparing the number of posts 
created by SP1s with all the other users identified through the data collection, we found that 
SP1s had created 54% of all the posts, broadly in line with Graham and Wright (2014). But 
this is arguably distorted, because at the other extreme we found that 75,349 accounts -55% 
of all accounts—had never made a single post, while 17,454 users had made 1 post. Put 
simply, the more posts and users, the more resources and time are required to collect and 
work with the data. 
 
Issue 3: Interface Design 
The structure of website interfaces impacts the nature of the discussion online (Wright & 
Street 2007). Initially, we hoped to compare an Australian and a Chinese discussion forum 
with similar topics and a prima facie similar interface, alongside two ostensibly similar 
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micro-blogging platforms: Weibo and Twitter. However, there are a number of important 
differences that made this difficult/impossible.  
Focusing on the micro-blogs first, arguably the structure of Weibo is better at facilitating 
deliberation than Twitter, and there is sometimes significant discussion on Weibo, with 
thousands of comments. Second, while Weibo has the same 140 character limit as Twitter, in 
Mandarin each character (or symbol) is a word and consequently Weibo allows a more 
extended comment and debate than Twitter (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015, p. 142). Weibo 
also allows the posting of videos, music, polls and long blogs. Weibo allows hashtags in a 
similar manner to Twitter, although there appears to be an approval process in place and this 
is generally more restricted. Another difference is that Weibo provides a detailed, hashtag-
organised directory. 
In regard to the Chinese discussion forum, because participants are told their comment is 
being reviewed complete and unsubtle pre-moderation encourages self-censorship. It seems 
likely that the lack of a public memberlist is a deliberate decision too. While this might be 
explained by a desire to protect user data, commercial forums (at least outside of China) 
provide such a list because it can help with community building. Another interpretation 
emphasises power and persuasion: a public list of users could be considered problematic 
because it makes it easier for people to identify social influencers and organise. 
An important aspect in the popularity of Weibo is ‘Big Vs’ who are highly popular and 
influential verified users—often celebrities—and a key part of the company’s marketing 
strategy. However, the potential political influence of ‘Big Vs’ – alongside the broader range 
of political talk occurring on Weibo (Sukosed & Fu, 2013; Yang, 2013) was an area of 
concern for the CPC. Big Vs were subjected to a crackdown. Several were arrested on a range 
of often unrelated charges (e.g. Xue Manzi), while new ‘rumour laws’ made it illegal to 
spread rumours, which are defined by the administration (Reuters, 2013). These two 
strategies proved quite effective at limiting politically sensitive talk. At the same time, many 




Businesses, lobby groups and governments all attempt to influence—and sometimes 
manipulate—online public opinion. For example, some bloggers secretly accept gifts or 
payment to positively review products. In our Chinese discussion forum, there is a whole 
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(public) section devoted to brands. The analysis of SP1s and SP2s indicated that a number 
were brand communication professionals.  
There are also attempts to ‘astroturf’ political debate by creating content that supports a 
certain position and/or attempts to silence or distort critics. Research suggests that 
astroturfing does impact public opinion (Cho et al., 2011). Astroturfing would appear to be of 
a different order in China: members of the so-called ‘50 Cent Party’ (wu mao dang), who are 
largely paid commenters, astroturf political talk. This means that the political talk we analyse 
may not be ‘natural’, but part of a strategic manipulation, and this is something that must be 
considered. 
 
Issue 5: Analysing moderation and censorship 
Moderation and censorship are crucial to the nature of online political debate (Wright, 2006). 
Within the model of super-participation, the third category (SP3s) is moderators and 
facilitators. When the typology was developed, we did not have authoritarian contexts in 
mind. Internationally most forums employ moderators or facilitators and normally one of 
their roles is to delete comments that do not meet community guidelines (e.g. foul language, 
trolling), and to more broadly encourage positive debate. Moderators and facilitators are, 
thus, an important influence on the nature of debate. China has a much more extensive, 
complex, and broadly government-directed system of political censorship and one of our 
research goals was to analyse how the Chinese moderators influenced debates. As most 
forums post-moderate, researchers can usually collect data as it is posted by users – before 
moderators have had chance to delete content – then compare this with what is left after 
moderation (King et al., 2013, 2014; Wright, 2006). However, our Chinese forum uses total 
pre-moderation, and thus we had to change our approach. In particular, the existence (or not) 
of published political talk (and coded political talk to avoid the censors—Esarey and Xiao, 
2008), as well as the topics of that talk, becomes an important research question and one that 
we attempted to address. It is not so much about the nature of the talk, but how it is regulated 
(King et al., 2013, 2014). An alternative approach is to create accounts and post messages 
with different political topics to test what is deleted or blocked (e.g. MacKinnon, 2009).  







In this article we have set out our theoretical and methodological approach to analysing 
everyday political in non-political online Chinese ‘third spaces’, as well as the 
methodological challenges that we faced. In so doing, the article hopes to encourage and 
facilitate further research into everyday online political talk in China. We argue both for a 
more inclusive definition of politics to be adopted—one that includes everyday political 
issues as well as ‘coded’ political terms used to avoid censorship—and for the study of 
political talk in formally non-political online third spaces. In this context, we argue that 
researchers cannot just use Habermas-inspired models of rational critical communication, but 
also need to value and analyse expressive forms of communication, such as humour. We then 
set out our coding frame for analysing everyday political talk in China. Finally, we turn to the 
methodological issues that we faced when analysing Chinese social and digital media, and 
how we responded to them. In particular, there were issues with getting access to data, its 
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1 A journalist from The Paper—a state-sponsored news website that has published stories on 
corruption—neatly sums up this balance: we have “never crossed the bottom line, neither has [The 
Paper] lost its background color–we have always been ‘red’. The message we want to send to the 
leadership is The Paper is one of the family…” (Deng, 2015). The problem—be it for citizens or 
journalists—is that these boundaries are (deliberately) left vague and constantly moving (Simons 
et al., 2016, online first).  
2  For example, Twitter previously had a 1500 tweet limit, but increased this to a maximum of 18000 
in March 2013 when changing from API 1.0 to API 1.1 but also effectively neutered access to the 
follows edge. For businesses, there is a balancing act: on the one hand, providing access to data 
through APIs can increase use, Apps, and thus positively impact profit. But the very data being 
‘given out’ is also commercially valuable and selling access to the data (e.g. Twitter’s Firehose) is 
an important part of the business model. Twitter’s Search API is searchable across several criteria 
including hashtag and keyword, but only returns a limited number of tweets and focuses on 
‘relevance and not completeness’ (Twitter, 2015). Furthermore, Twitter limits how often users can 
request data from the API (currently 180 times every 15 minutes), and if this is exceeded the user 
will be rate-limited—effectively paused—and the remaining data will be missed. 
3  The general keywords were clustered into topic areas with political institutions and governance (e.g. 
media institutions/ party media/CCTV or CCAV- 媒体/党媒/ CCTV or CCAV) alongside general 
topics such as parenting and childcare (which captured issues such as milk powder/food 
safety/children’s health -奶粉/食品安全/儿童公共卫生安全) and left-behind rural children (留守
儿童); marriage and family (including topics such as the marriage law/divorce law (婚姻法/离婚
法) and having more than one child (二胎/三胎); public health (e.g. smoking/anti-smoking/ban on 
smoking 吸烟/禁烟/控烟); and the environment (e.g. smog and climate change 雾霾/气候变化). 
4 There are many existing dictionaries of words that can be used, such as the Stanford NLP Chinese 
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